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Reassessing Britain’s ‘Post-War Consensus’: The Politics of 
Reason, 1945 – 1979.  
 
 
 
Since the late-1970s, scholars have been engaged in a vibrant debate about the nature of 
post-war British politics. While some writers have suggested that the three decades that 
succeeded the Second World War witnessed a bi-partisan consensus on key policy 
questions, others have argued that it was conflict, not agreement, that marked the period. 
This article offers a novel contribution to this controversy by drawing attention to the 
epistemological beliefs of the Labour and Conservative parties. It argues that once these 
beliefs are considered, it becomes possible to reconcile some of the competing claims 
made by proponents and critics of the ‘post-war consensus’ thesis. Labour and 
Conservative leaders may have been wedded to different beliefs, but they also shared a 
common enthusiasm for empiricist reasoning and were both reluctant to identify fixed 
political ‘ends’ that they sought to realise.  Consequently, they were both committed to 
evolutionary forms of change, and they eschewed the notion that any social or political 
arrangement was of universal value.   
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In politics the way things are done matters more than what is done. 
 
Bryan Magee (1962) 
 
 
I will join you in the fight against Socialist dogmatism wherever it rears its 
head. But do not ask me to oppose it with an equal or opposite Conservative 
dogmatism. 
 
Edward Boyle (1972) 
 
It is now forty years since Paul Addison (1975) published his seminal study of wartime Britain, 
yet scholars continue to debate the validity of the thesis that it popularised. Addison’s central 
argument was that the Second World War, which placed new demands upon the state and 
fostered popular enthusiasm for collectivist forms of social provision, witnessed the emergence 
of a ‘Whitehall consensus’ on key policy questions. Its central pillars were the Beveridgean 
welfare state, a mixed economy and a Keynesian economic strategy, and it was informed by a 
set of aspirations that were broadly social democratic in character.1 Addison did not offer an 
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expansive discussion of post-war politics, but he did suggest that the consensus he described 
had endured until the mid-1970s. 
From the late-1980s, a number of studies (Jones, 1996; Pimlott, 1989) challenged 
Addison’s thesis.2 These critiques took different forms. While some accounts (Kerr, 2001) 
exposed significant policy changes that took place in the post-war period, others (Marlow, 
1996) suggested that consensus narratives had concealed significant aspects of political 
contestation. But common to several of them was an argument about the main parties’ political 
thought. Far from sharing some common assumptions and beliefs, the Labour and Conservative 
parties, they argued, were wedded to different ideologies. Particular attention was devoted to 
the parties’ views regarding the distribution of wealth and social status. While the former had 
been committed to creating a more equal social order, their Conservative opponents, it was 
argued, had sought to preserve certain forms of inequality. Accordingly, these studies 
challenged the notion that continuity in the realm of public policy reflected any meaningful 
ideological agreement. What followed was something of a historiographical stalemate. Some 
scholars, despite acknowledging that ideological conflict was a feature of the period, argued 
that because this conflict was contained within a set of ideational parameters, it remained 
possible to identify a relative, rather than absolute, consensus (Dutton, 1991; Hay, 1996; Lowe, 
1996). Other writers (Marlow, 1996; Kerr, 2001), by contrast, suggested that the disputes 
between the Labour and Conservative parties were so fundamental that the term consensus 
could not adequately describe the post-war political order. 
 The following article traces one potential route out of this impasse.3 It does so by 
exploring a feature of Britain’s intellectual politics that was largely ignored by the above 
literature, namely the epistemological beliefs that informed the Labour and Conservative 
parties’ political thought. It will be argued that once adequate attention is devoted to these 
beliefs, it becomes possible to reconcile some of the competing claims that have been offered 
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by proponents and critics of the consensus thesis; for doing so demonstrates that while the 
parties offered different conceptions of desirable political change, their ideological contestation 
was partially contained by their common understandings of human reason. Not only did the 
dominant intellectual formations within the two parties share a common enthusiasm for 
empiricist modes of reasoning, but they were also reluctant to specify fixed ‘ends’ that they 
sought to realise. In turn, they tended to prefer evolutionary reform, and they were both hostile 
to the notion that any individual or party could possess a monopoly of truth. Identifying this 
epistemological convergence is not, in itself, sufficient to demonstrate the existence or 
otherwise or a post-war consensus. What is may suggest, however, is that if such a consensus 
did exist, we might have been looking for it in the wrong places.  
 After providing brief descriptions of the ideological formations that shaped the main 
parties’ thought in the post-war period, the discussion pursues three lines of enquiry. First, it 
identifies the assumptions that informed the Labour and Conservative parties’ understandings 
of human reason and explores their implications for their broader political thought.  Second, it 
interrogates the way in which these assumptions informed their understandings of the social 
order. And finally, it demonstrates how the parties’ attitudes towards the concept of equality 
were mediated by epistemological concerns.   
 
Middle Way Conservatism and Revisionist Social Democracy  
Throughout the post-war period, the Labour and Conservative parties were intellectual 
coalitions. Indeed they both hosted a range of ideological traditions that competed with one 
another for authority. But of these traditions, two can be said to have achieved hegemony within 
their respective parties: ‘Middle Way Conservatism’ and ‘revisionist socialist democracy’.4 
Each will be described briefly.  
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The origins of Middle Way Conservatism can be traced to the late inter-war period, 
when some Conservatives began to challenge the classical economic ideas that had informed 
inter-war economic policy. Perhaps the most notable was Harold Macmillan. In response to the 
phenomenon of mass unemployment, Macmillan (1938) came to advocate a ‘middle way’ 
economic strategy that could reconcile capitalist enterprise and social justice by employing the 
state to repair the vagaries of the price mechanism.5 Following the Conservatives’ defeat in the 
1945 election, a number of younger Conservatives, including David Clarke, Quintin Hogg, 
R.A. Butler and Ian Macleod, embraced similar ideas. Rehearsing arguments that had been 
articulated by Burke, they argued (Hogg, 1947, pp. 24-30, p. 250) that the principal task of 
Conservatism was to create an ‘identity of interest between all classes’. And because they 
believed that social deprivation threatened to erode the unity of the organic social order, they 
accepted the Beveridgean welfare state and identified full employment as the principal 
objective of economic policy. Indeed they argued that if the burdens of war were not equally 
shared, the harmony of the social order could be disturbed (Hogg, 1944, pp. 56-57). Together, 
these figures were instrumental in shifting the balance of forces within the parliamentary party, 
and by 1951, they had significantly modified the party’s policy programme (Gamble, 1975, pp. 
38-57). Here, the publication of The Industrial Charter (Conservative Party, 1947) was 
particularly significant. As well as detailing a corporatist industrial policy, this document also 
acknowledged the need for some industries to remain under public ownership.  
 An organicist conception of the social order informed Middle Way Conservatives’ 
political thinking (Clarke, 1947, p. 12; Hogg, 1947, p. 24). Human communities, they argued, 
were comparable to living organisms, for like such organisms, they were comprised of 
interdependent components whose existence depended on their mutual co-operation. Two basic 
commitments followed from this understanding of the social order: a desire to unite different 
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social groups and a commitment to preserving the institutions and practices that were 
conducive to social stability.  
Revisionist social democracy emerged in the immediate post-war period and gained 
momentum following Labour’s successive defeats in the 1951 and 1955 General Elections. At 
the core of its ideological architecture was a particular understanding of post-war capitalism 
(Reisman, 1997, pp. 53-54; Crosland, 1956; Jay, 1960). Far from being the exploitative entity 
that Marx had described, the capitalist order, it was argued, had been rendered benign by 
changes in the productive system. Not only had the emergence of a managerial class weakened 
the relationship between ownership and control, but the expansion of trade union authority had 
also transferred a significant degree of power to the labour movement. This sanguine reading 
of post-war capitalism led revisionists to question the efficacy of some traditional socialist 
assumptions. They were particularly critical of the assumption that further measures of 
nationalisation would advance the socialist cause. A mixed economy, they argued, could be 
rendered compatible with egalitarian objectives (Crosland, 1956, pp. 56-78; Magee, 1962, p. 
13). 
Revisionists regarded a commitment to equality as the defining feature of their belief 
systems. Anthony Crosland (1956, p. 113) thus wrote that the distinctive socialist ideal was 
social equality, while Douglas Jay (1960, p. 7) stated that equality was the ‘specifically socialist 
aim’. But for reasons that will be discussed below, revisionists were reluctant to specify a 
particular distribution of wealth that they believed was desirable. Instead, they suggested that 
the appropriate distribution of wealth at any moment should be determined on the basis of 
empirical enquiry. As Crosland (1974, p. 17) put it, ‘[a] practicing politician … is not required 
to answer the stern examiner’s question: how much equality ultimately?’6 Nor did revisionists 
believe that all forms of redistributive activity were commensurable with social equality. 
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Indeed they believed that further increases in taxation could impair productivity and, in turn, 
reduce the surplus available for public expenditure (Crosland, 2006, p. 168).  
At this juncture, it must be noted that the authority of the above formations varied over 
time and that their influence over the main parties’ policy programmes ebbed and flowed. It 
would thus be inappropriate to make general claims about the existence or otherwise of a post-
war policy consensus by studying their respective epistemologies. What such an enquiry can 
expose, however, is that epistemological ideas often informed the political contestation of the 
post-war period. The article’s intention, then, is not offer a general argument about the 
existence or otherwise of a post-war consensus. Rather, its intention is to demonstrate that if 
such a consensus did exist, it may have had an epistemological foundation.  
 
Reason and Politics  
We are now equipped with a vast literature that explores the thought of the Labour and 
Conservative parties (Beech and Hickson, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Hickson, 2005; Ellison, 1994; 
Green, 2002). What this literature has largely ignored, however, is the epistemological beliefs 
that informed the parties’ thinking. And such an omission is significant, since it was these 
beliefs that mediated their respective attitudes to the discipline of politics and informed their 
approaches to governance (Rosenberg, 1989, p. 96). Before they could award a particular 
practice or value meaning and significance, both parties needed to establish what was knowable 
about both present conditions and the consequences of future activity, and they were thus 
required to draw upon beliefs about the nature of human reason and its appropriate uses.   
Reason is a contested concept (Gallie, 1956; Freeden, 1996) that can be awarded a range 
of different meanings. And when they claim to be rational actors, individuals can engage in 
different kinds of thinking. It is useful, then, to draw a distinction between rationality and 
rationalism. While the former can be defined as the quality of being rational, the latter is a 
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particular mode of rationality that regards human reason as the supreme source of human 
knowledge. It is possible, then, for an actor to challenge rationalism in the name of rationality 
(see Oakeshott, 1962, pp. 5-42). 
When we explore, in the abstract sense, the epistemologies of socialism and 
conservatism, we encounter a crucial distinction: whereas the conservative, who prefers the 
‘knowable to the unknowable’, possesses no ‘vision of the future’, the socialist, by virtue of 
their rationalism, is committed to proposing measures that can realise a specified future 
(Freeden, 1996, p. 355).7 Yet the particular formations that this article is concerned with did 
not adhere to these general positions. Let us begin with revisionist social democracy. Instead 
of seeking to construct an abstract vision of the future that could be realised, revisionists were 
committed to empiricist modes of reasoning. Indeed they were suspicious of utopian modes of 
thought, and they eschewed the suggestion that the social order could be re-made in a new 
image. 
Central to revisionists’ thought was a critique of the epistemology that had informed 
orthodox Marxism. One of their principal objections concerned Marx’s attempt to abstract a 
‘universal phenomenon’ that governed the process of historical change (Durbin, 1940, p. 189). 
This aspiration, it was argued, was futile, for history was comprised of events that were 
unpredictable and whose causes were contingent rather than universal. This argument was 
posed with particular force by Bryan Magee (1962, p. 44), who wrote that: ‘the truth is [that] 
… in human affairs we can see only a short way ahead, and even then our predictions are highly 
fallible and often wrong.’8 This conception of history had significant implications for 
revisionists’ understanding of appropriate political conduct. Most importantly, it led them to 
advocate a gradualist approach to politics, whereby incremental reform was preferred to radical 
change. One of the clearest justifications of this approach was offered by Crosland (1956, p. 
314): 
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The essential argument for evolutionary change is that it allows one to be 
experimental, since the problems involved in change then unfold themselves at 
a speed which gives ample time for dealing with them … One should never 
monkey around with society too much; if we do, we may find that history has 
some unpleasant surprises up its sleeve for us. 
 
In place of the abstract theorising of Marxism, revisionists constructed an empiricist conception 
of rationality, whereby propositions were tested through empirical observation. Such an 
approach, it was argued, was valuable for two reasons. First, it guarded against the sort of 
utopian propositions that could be deduced from ‘pre-scientific’ modes of political thought 
And second, it accommodated the change that was the only permanent feature of modern 
societies. Similar strands of reasoning can be identified in the writings of pre-war socialists 
(Cole, 1938, pp. 133-160). But while earlier socialists like John Strachey (1938, p. 386) had 
placed considerable faith in the capacity of human reason to theorise social phenomena, 
revisionists, under the influence of post-war positivism, offered a more sceptical conception of 
reason.9  
Often, revisionists’ sensitivity to the unpredictability of change led them to advocate a 
relativist approach to political questions. For if the consequences of change could not be 
anticipated, it followed that no particular arrangement or belief could be universally valuable. 
Hence Bryan Magee (1962, p. 37) doubted whether: 
 
anything that is taken for granted now will still be taken for granted three 
thousand years from now. Therefore we should not hold our beliefs and 
assumptions with unalterable certitude. The best reason we can have for holding 
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them – the only good reason for holding them – is that they have stood up to 
critical examination so far, and stood up better than any known alternative.10 
 
For Magee (1962, p. 44), the fallibility of reason compelled policy-makers to be receptive to 
the lessons of experience. It was inappropriate, he wrote, to ‘work out a theory that will tell us 
what to do in all future situations’. Instead, it was necessary to ‘assess the facts of each actual 
situation, and decide what to do in light of them’. Because they adhered to such beliefs, 
revisionists were also critical of the notion that the left had exclusive access to the truth. As 
Jeremy Nuttall (2005, pp. 671-672) has demonstrated, they were willing to acknowledge that 
some attitudes and characters of mind that were associated with Conservatism were of value. 
Moreover, they suggested that effective political action often emerged from the constructive 
inter-play of rival political forces. Douglas Jay (1960, p. 33) thus suggested that ‘the future for 
humanity will look a little less gloomy when those in either camp not merely recognise that the 
other genuinely admires its own strange ideal, but even that there is value in both’. Striking a 
similar note, Magee (1962, p. 47) reproduced the following statement from Edmund Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France: ‘I have never seen any plan which has not been 
mended by the observations of those who were much inferior in understanding to the person 
who took the lead in the business.’11 
  In many instances, revisionists’ thinking about rationality was shaped by their readings 
of Karl Popper’s early works. Magee (2010, p. 179) and Crosland were indebted to The Open 
Society and Its Enemies, and complimentary references to Popper’s ideas can be found in most 
statements of revisionist thought.12 A full summary of Popper’s epistemological ideas cannot 
be offered here, but it is instructive to outline the basic political propositions that followed from 
them. First, Popper, under the influence of Hume, argued that because no statement could be 
universally true, reason was a fallible faculty. It thus followed that the task of social science, 
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and indeed of rational politics, was not to understand society so that its future could be planned. 
Rather, it was to ‘study the unwieldiness, the resilience or the brittleness of the social stuff, of 
its resistance to our attempts to mould it and work with it’ (Parvin, 2013, p. 69). Second, Popper 
(1966, p. 157; Shearmur, 1996) offered a proposition regarding the appropriate nature of 
political reform. Because the consequences of a particular act could not be wholly anticipated, 
it was appropriate, he argued, for policy-makers to engage in piecemeal reform whose 
consequences could be subjected to empirical observation. Popper’s preference for such 
reformism stemmed from a critique of social engineering which sought to achieve an ‘ultimate 
end’. According to his reasoning (Popper, 1966, p. 162), such practices were deficient because 
there could be no rational method for determining the desirability of these ‘ultimate’ objectives. 
Finally, Popper offered an argument about the appropriate subject of rational enquiry. Unlike 
historicist thinkers, whose principal concern was to observe the laws of history, he suggested 
that social enquiry should study observable social institutions and arrangements. It followed 
that politics should be concerned with determining the purpose and efficiency of existing 
institutions and modifying them accordingly.  
Significantly, these three propositions are broadly compatible with a conservative 
disposition, for they invite a mode of reasoning that ‘prefers the tried to the untried, fact to 
mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the 
sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect’ (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 408).13 
Indeed Popper might have agreed with Oakeshott’s suggestion (1991, p. 60) that politics was 
an activity with ‘neither starting-place nor appointed destination.’ That is not to say that the 
full range of Popper’s ideas can be rendered compatible with conservative beliefs. There are 
some features of his thought, namely his suspicion of the concept of nationhood, which few 
conservatives would be willing to endorse. But his basic approach to epistemological questions 
was commensurable with the conservative’s suspicion of utopianism and their preference for 
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gradual, rather than radical, change. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that Middle Way 
Conservatives were also receptive to Popper’s epistemology. Here, it is instructive to make 
particular reference to Edward Boyle’s thought, for he authored several appraisals of The Open 
Society over the course of the post-war period. Boyle’s (1974, p. 844) basic argument was that 
Popper had established a ‘middle way’ between Stalinist logic and the reactionary responses to 
post-war welfarism. Indeed Popper’s epistemology, he argued, had demonstrated the absurdity 
of both utopian rationalism and romanticist irrationalism. Boyle concluded that ‘Popper’s 
emphasis on criticism, on ‘piecemeal’ reform, and on evaluation of what was actually done, 
seemed to me just the corrective that was needed.’ In part, Boyle’s enthusiasm for The Open 
Society emerged from his sympathy with Popper’s views regarding morality. In short, Popper 
believed that while the responsibility for our ethical decisions was ‘entirely ours’ and we should 
seek absolutely right or valid proposals’, individuals should not persuade themselves that we 
have ‘definitively found them’. Boyle (1974, pp. 851-852) approved of this proposition, and 
by drawing upon the work of another philosopher, A.J. Ayer, he offered a riposte to the notion 
that any normative proposition could be eternally valid. 
These beliefs had important consequences for Boyle’s broader understanding of 
politics. As well as leading him to place emphasis on the virtues of patience and moderation, 
they also compelled him to be suspicious of the notion that politics was a search for eternal 
truths. In 1974, when he delivered a speech to the OUCA on Conservative values (Boyle, 
1974b), he offered the following statements in his notes: 
 
Flexibility & adaptability … 
Scepticism […] not too much quest for certainty. 
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Similar views were advanced by Ian Gilmour. The principal objective of the Tory party, 
Gilmour (1978, p. 125, p. 153) wrote, was to: 
 
make trial of the age. It should be a benevolent inquisition, checking and 
questioning what is in appearance the dominant orthodoxy of the day … This 
is all the more necessary since, as Karl Popper has pointed out, “nothing ever 
comes off exactly as intended”. 
 
This statement deployed the same epistemological reasoning that could be found in Bryan 
Magee’s The New Radicalism and other revisionist texts. By preferring ‘benevolent inquisition’ 
to abstract theorising, Gilmour rehearsed the revisionists’ argument that empirical enquiry was 
the most adequate procedure for determining appropriate political activity.   
When conducting their empirical investigations, revisionists and Conservatives could, 
of course, evaluate their evidence against different criteria.  Put simply, what a revisionist 
regarded as a desirable outcome of a particular arrangement could, for the Conservative, 
constitute an undesirable one. But if revisionists and Middle Way Conservatives’ empirical 
investigations did not always lead them to the same arguments, their Popperite impulses did 
encourage them to seek ‘partial’ rather than ‘ultimate’ ends and to acknowledge the positive 
contributions that their opponents had made to public policy.  Crosland (1956, p. 61) noted this 
feature of post-war politics in 1956, when he wrote that the ‘typically pragmatic and empirical’ 
Conservative party had come to accept many of the reforms that had been introduced by the 
Attlee governments: ‘Nostalgically as Conservatives may think back to particular features of 
that [inter-war] era, such as the low taxation, they could hardly, by any feat of self-deception, 
beget a deep emotional devotion to pre-war society as a whole, or convince themselves that the 
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1930s were a glorious age’. In turn, he (Crosland, 1962, p. 238) argued that many of the 
‘burning issues of the past’ had come to assume a rather marginal character.  
Crosland’s description of his political opponents was certainly valid. Because they were 
suspicious of rationalist conceptions of knowledge, Middle Way Conservatives were also 
critical of the notion that any particular party or individual could possess a monopoly of truth. 
And in turn, they eschewed the notion that the appropriate response to a harmful body of beliefs 
was to oppose them with antipodal ones. Such a proposition was evident in Edward Boyle’s 
(Boyle and Crosland, 1972, p. 18) speech to the Conservatives’ 1968 conference: 
 
I will join you in the fight against Socialist dogmatism wherever it rears its 
head. But do not ask me to oppose it with an equal or opposite Conservative 
dogmatism, because in education, it is the dogmatism itself which is wrong. 
 
Similar reasoning can be identified in Francis Pym’s (1984, p. 172) The Politics of Consent, in 
which Pym challenged the ideas that informed the Thatcher government’s economic policy. 
‘One consequence of Socialism,’ Pym wrote, ‘has been to encourage Conservatives to see 
themselves primarily as anti-Socialists. This can lead to a mistaken tendency to substitute one 
ideology for another’. For both Boyle and Pym, then, the adequate response to dogmatic 
politics was not to construct an alternative ideology that was its opposite. Such an enterprise, 
they argued, would be informed by the same rationalist fallacies that informed socialist 
dogmatism. The preferred procedure was to construct a programme of reform that could 
neutralise the appeal of dogmatic politics.14  
When pursuing such strategies, Middle Way Conservatives often sought to construct a 
dialogue with the forces of the left. As Quintin Hogg (1947, p. 13) put it, ‘[Conservatives] feel 
themselves entitled to make use of the true lessons taught by their opponents … There is no 
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copyright in truth and what is controversial politics at one moment may after experience and 
reflections easily become common ground.’ In a draft version of the text from which this 
statement was extracted, Hogg (1946) went as far as to suggest that the function of 
Conservatism was to provide a Hegelian synthesis in the midst of adversarial struggle: 
 
The function of Conservatism is to present a synthesis, that is to say, not a 
compromise between two conflicting purposes and principles, since political 
compromise means a bargain struck in which each side for the sake of peace 
abandons part of what they logically claim, but a genuine reconciliation of the 
two conflicting principles based on a more profound analysis and a higher level 
of thought. 
    
Pym (1984, p. 191) produced a similar formulation in his aforementioned text. Reflecting on 
the rise of Thatcherism, he appealed for a ‘balanced’ system of politics that could reconcile the 
competing claims of its constituent components: ‘two opposed extremes do not create harmony, 
just as two wrongs do not make a right’. To legitimate this arrangement, Pym (1984, p. 177) 
offered a challenge to the Thatcherite critique of ‘consensus politics’. Consensus politics did 
not, as Thatcher had suggested, reflect the ‘lowest common denominator of all viewpoints’. It 
instead concerned the ‘means by which the policy is agreed and implemented’.15    
 At this juncture, it is instructive to note that Middle Way Conservatives’ challenge to 
Thatcher’s project was epistemological in nature. Indeed their criticism of Thatcher’s approach 
to politics was not only rooted in concerns about her policies; it also stemmed from a 
disagreement with the epistemology that informed them (Gilmour, 1992, pp. 331-33). 
Thatcher’s mistaken assumption, it was argued, was that a particular mechanism, the market, 
could be a panacea to the social and economic problems that Britain had encountered. It 
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followed that far from being a Conservative, Thatcher was an ideologue who had reproduced 
the same rationalist logic that was present in the ideology she reviled. That is not to say, of 
course, that Middle Way Conservatism was not itself an ideology. In offering a critique of what 
they perceived to be Thatcherite rationalism, its advocates were articulating their own 
epistemological beliefs and assumptions. But it is notable that these beliefs and assumptions 
were so central to their understanding of Conservatism’s appropriate function.  
To legitimate their commitment to pluralist politics, Middle Way Conservatives often 
suggested that there was a mutually inclusive relationship between consensus and continuity. 
A virtuous arrangement or practice, it was argued, could only be preserved if there was a shared 
understanding of the meanings and lessons of its past. And establishing such a shared 
understanding required the diffusion of power between the ‘various interests which make up 
the present (Patten, 1983, p. 18).16 This did not, of course, lead them to regard the absence of 
disagreement as a political objective in itself. It did, however, lead them to regard politics as a 
conversation that required the presence of other voices. Indeed they might have agreed with 
Oakeshott (1962, p. 396) when he stated his preference for ‘slow, small changes which have 
behind them a voluntary consensus of opinion’.  
 
The above survey has demonstrated that Middle Way Conservatives and their revisionist 
opponents shared some common assumptions about human reason.  Both were suspicious of 
the notion that particular political arrangements could be universally valuable, and both shared 
a concomitant enthusiasm for evolutionary, rather than radical, forms of change. It is also 
possible to detect a basic convergence on the means of determining appropriate conduct. Rather 
than measuring practices against abstract conceptions of an alternative order, they began their 
enquiries by observing existing social conditions. In turn, they tended to assume that those 
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individuals who possessed an empirically-informed understanding of social problems were best 
placed to inform political conduct (Kavanagh and Morris, 1989, p. 6).17  
 
Reason and Society 
Political ideologies are concerned, above all else, with justifying or changing the social and 
political arrangements of a political community (Freeden, 2003). In order to understand their 
character, it is thus necessary to determine their adherents’ understandings of the social 
environment that they inhabit. Not only do such understandings mediate their attitudes towards 
the desirability and pace of change, but they will also shape their views regarding the capacity 
of rational argument to achieve such change.  What follows is a comparative analysis of the 
assumptions and beliefs that informed the way in which Middle Way Conservatives and 
revisionist social democrats understood post-war British society.     
Departing from the reasoning that informed earlier modes of socialist thought, 
revisionists argued that irrational forces shaped the basic features of the social order. Here, the 
work of Evan Durbin was particularly significant. In response to the outbreak of the Second 
World War, Durbin (1942, p. 96) explored the subconscious patterns of thought that shaped 
individuals’ behaviour. His principal conclusion was that feelings that were repressed within 
the individual often found a social outlet. ‘From the secret places of the heart,’ he wrote, ‘there 
floods up into political and social affairs the torrents of irrational feeling, both positive and 
negative, which make the relations of social groups unstable and uncontrollable’.18 Two 
decades later, revisionists reproduced similar propositions. Magee (1962, p. 18), for instance, 
noted that ‘[t]he important truth which irrationalists have grasped is that the objects of human 
activity are not determined by reason but by our physical and emotional needs’. This sensitivity 
to the irrationality of human behaviour did not lead revisionists to eschew rational politics, but 
it did lead them to restrict its function. The task of rational thought, they argued, was to 
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determine the appropriate means to realising ends that were often shaped by basic needs and 
wants that were external to reason (Magee, 1962, p. 19).  
As well as being suspicious of the notion that the social order was comprised of rational 
actors, revisionists were also reluctant to believe that reasoned argument could repair the 
irrational and undesirable kinds of thought that they observed (see Ellison, 1994, p. 90 and 
Nuttall, 2005, pp. 2-3). David Reisman (1997, p. 123) has identified in Anthony Crosland’s 
thought a ‘misanthropic acceptance of envious resentment as a fact of life’. Any egalitarian 
reformist, Crosland argued, had to confront the fact that social envy was ‘quite natural’. Plant 
(1996, pp. 172-73) has alleged that this feature of Crosland’s thought was as much a 
consequence of Crosland’s epistemology as it was a product of his understanding of social 
change. Under the influence of A. J. Ayer, Crosland, he argues, believed that because it was 
not possible to provide philosophical justifications for our value commitments, it was necessary 
to regard individual’s value preferences as being largely immutable.19 Accordingly, he was 
enthusiastic about forms of political activity that could achieve egalitarian outcomes without 
requiring a significant shift in social attitudes. In his post-war book, Douglas Jay (1960, p. 347) 
also described undesirable social attitudes as being permanent features of the social order that 
could not be dissolved through rational argument. He devoted particular attention to snobbery, 
which he described as a ‘disease of the spirit’ that was external to politics. Following the logic 
of his argument, he then stated that the reformer should concentrate attention on injustices that 
were capable of social cure through legislative activity. 
For revisionists, these features of the social order had important political implications. 
Not only did they expose the absurdity of utopian aspirations, but they also necessitated an 
approach to reform that began with observable realities. For Magee (1962, p. 141) this meant, 
‘taking on responsibility for society as it is and starting from there’. To begin the task of 
political reform by establishing an ‘imagined society’ that was desirable was, he argued, to 
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ignore the constraints that the present imposed upon the future. Magee was not alone in making 
such observations. A decade earlier, Austen Albu (1952, p. 141) offered a similar view in a 
discussion of Labour’s economic policy:  
 
The proposals here made arise out of the application of socialist philosophy to 
an empirical study of existing economic institutions. The functions that a 
particular institution performs in a complex society are many and varied and 
not all of them are to be discovered in its overt aims and objectives. It is the hall 
mark of Utopianism to make legislative changes and to break up existing 
institutions without due consideration of these functions and of the human 
relationships on which they depend. 
 
As we have seen, Middle Way Conservatives often described the social order in organicist 
terms (Seawright, 2010, pp. 33-34). Central to such descriptions was the notion that 
interdependence, and indeed complexity, was a necessary feature of any developed society. 
Thus David Clarke (1947, p. 12) wrote that ‘society is an organic whole in which the several 
atoms react in all their movements upon one another and the whole is moved this way and that 
by the motion of its several parts’. Such notions were not, however, the exclusive property of 
Conservatives. Indeed when we survey revisionist discourses, we can identify similar 
formulations. Consider, then, the following statement, which is extracted from the first edition 
of Anthony Crosland’s The Future of Socialism (1956, p. 314): 
 
The fact is that a society like ours is an organic unity … one so highly organised 
and interdependent between its various parts, resting as it does on a balance of 
tensions, thrusts, and stresses, that intervention at one point will have effects at 
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numerous and often unexpected other points. One therefore cannot give it a 
shock of more than a certain violence without the risk of damage to the entire 
structure. 
 
For Crosland, then, Britain’s social order, by virtue of its complexity, was a vulnerable entity 
whose responses to reform could not be anticipated. Exposing Crosland’s enthusiasm for such 
a conception of the social order is not, of course, sufficient to demonstrate that he shared the 
Conservatives’ understanding of the forces that shaped its character. Indeed it is possible to 
imagine Crosland objecting to the conservative notion that the organic social order was 
necessarily an unequal one because talents and skills were distributed unevenly. Nonetheless, 
his organicist understanding of society does expose a mistrust of violent change that was 
replicated within Conservative discourses.  
 
Middle Way Conservatives were also suspicious of the notion that the social order was 
infinitely receptive to political activity. Two clusters of beliefs informed this feature of their 
thinking. The first concerned the extra-human forces that shaped the character of the social 
order. Chief amongst them was a belief in the Christian doctrine of original sin, which asserted 
that undesirable human qualities were pre-ordained and ineliminable. As Reginald Northam 
(1939, p. 61) put it, ‘Man’s goodness ultimately depends on the things of the Spirit’.20 As a 
corollary, Conservatives rejected the notion that human societies were perfectible. The second 
cluster of beliefs related to their organicist understandings of the social order. Since the social 
order’s development was the product of forces that were extra-human, it was absurd to suggest 
that it was infinitely receptive to human reason. As Edward Boyle (1974) put it, ‘this is not a 
plastic world, instantly and easily remade’. 
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 But if Middle Way Conservatives acknowledged the limitations of human rationality, 
it would be inappropriate to suggest that they did not award reason a positive function. Their 
enemy was rationalism, not reason, and it is possible to identify some ways in which Middle 
Way Conservatives diverged from the epistemological pessimism of some of their 
predecessors. We can take, as an example, Macmillan’s embrace of indicative planning in the 
wake of the economic crises of the 1930s. Speaking in the House of Commons in 1932, 
Macmillan (HC Debates, 4 November 1931) stated that: 
 
you have somehow to create in the mind of everybody that there is a plan, that 
there is something to hope for; then they will give their sacrifices, and they will 
not mind the temporary sacrifices if they believe them to be temporary. If the 
Government and the House can, as a result of these Debates, reveal to the people 
that there is a determination to cast aside party definitions, and that none of us 
will say, "That is a Socialist scheme," or "That is a Tory scheme," but if we will 
bring an objective and realist view to these problems … I think we can recreate 
in the people the faith and the hope upon which they must depend if they are to 
go through the grave difficulties from which they are now suffering and the 
terrible disasters that are afflicting many a home. 
 
Two features of this statement are worthy of comment. First, we can note the way in which 
Macmillan privileges a core conservative commitment, namely the preservation of social 
harmony, in order to legitimate rational intervention in the operation of the economy. By 
appealing to a familiar conservative concern, Macmillan was able to justify the employment of 
a policy instrument that had often been viewed with scepticism by Conservatives. Second, we 
can note Macmillan’s willingness to identify the reasoned search for an ‘objective’ solution as 
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an urgent political task. In doing so, Macmillan acknowledged that it was desirable for some 
degree of consensus to exist between the dominant political traditions and that such a consensus 
was dependent upon the ability or rational argument to triumph over partisan prejudices.  
Not all conservatives were sympathetic to Middle Way Conservatives’ attempts to 
extend the permissible role of human reason. Michael Oakeshott (1948), for instance, 
complained that the Conservative party was betraying the values of conservatism by embracing 
the concept of planning. In a review of Hogg’s The Case for Conservatism, he wrote that the 
‘rationalist bug’ had bitten the Conservatives and suggested that the party should resume its 
defence of customary arrangements rather than defending innovations on the basis of their 
potential consequences. It is not necessary here to establish whether Oakeshott’s criticism were 
valid. But his forthright intervention does suggest that while Middle Way Conservatives 
retained a sceptical reading of human reason, they did award it a function that it had not 
acquired in older variants of Conservative thinking.  
 
Revisionists and Middle Way Conservatives thus shared some common assumptions about 
both human reason and its capacity to modify the social order. Both eschewed utopian 
aspirations to imagine a perfect social order, both appealed to empirical enquiry in their efforts 
to provide solutions to repair defects within it and both were suspicious of the notion that any 
particular arrangement was of universal value. This convergence should not encourage the 
conclusion that social democrats and Conservatives shared an identical understanding of the 
social environment that they inhabited, for it is clear that the former were less willing to regard 
the existing arrangements as being desirable and more willing to place particular values at the 
core of their belief systems. But adherents of both formations acknowledged that the social 
order was shaped by forces that were resistant to rational argument, and they thus shared a 
common preference for evolutionary reform. 
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Reason and Equality 
The epistemological beliefs of revisionists and Middle Way Conservatives mediated their 
broader thinking. Indeed in shaping their understandings of the capacity of political activity to 
achieve change, they did much to determine their engagements with particular political 
concepts. The final section of the article demonstrates these mediations by exploring their 
respective engagements with the concept of equality.  
The selection of this concept is deliberate. For in their efforts to draw a distinction 
between the respective ideologies of the Labour and Conservative parties, critics of the 
consensus thesis (Jones, 1996; Marlow, 1996) have often cast their gaze upon it. While 
Labour’s social democrats were egalitarians, their conservative opponents, it is argued, were 
committed to defending disparities of wealth and status. At one level, a survey of the respective 
discourses of the parties invites such a description. After all, Labour’s revisionists declared that 
their principal objective was to construct a more egalitarian order, while Conservatives often 
sought to legitimate certain inequalities of wealth and status. And when they approached 
distributive questions, they began from different starting-points. For the social democrat, the 
enquiry began with the following question: ‘what are the factors justifying differentials?’ 
(Jackson, 2005, p. 169). In other words, they began from the assumption that a particular form 
of inequality was illegitimate until it was demonstrated that it generated just consequences. 
Middle Way Conservatives, by contrast, posed an alternative question. ‘What distribution of 
wealth and status,’ they asked, ‘is most conducive to the organic development of the social 
order?’ And because they believed that some inequalities were natural and immutable, they 
tended to assume that certain forms of equality were inimical to organic change. But when they 
were answering these questions, social democrats and Middle Way Conservatives often drew 
upon similar epistemological beliefs. The below discussion will draw out these commonalities.  
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First, we can challenge the notion that conservatism is a philosophy of inequality. This 
argument has been reproduced in a number of discussions of British Conservatism (Dorey, 
2011; Hickson, 2005), yet it is informed by a problematic understanding of the status that the 
concept of inequality possesses within conservative thought. Because they adhere to a limited 
conception of human reason, conservatives are reluctant to suggest that any particular 
arrangement is of universal value.21 Consequently, while they are suspicious of the 
egalitarianism of orthodox socialism, they are equally reluctant to regard inequality as a 
panacea, and they do not regard its defence as being an end in itself. That is why Quintin Hogg 
(1947, p. 181) could state that ‘Conservatives do not … necessarily defend the particular 
distribution of wealth as any given moment, or claim that it is incapable of improvement’. It is 
thus necessary to acknowledge that for conservatives, a commitment to inequality is an 
adjacent commitment which can, in certain conditions, be modified or indeed discarded. That 
is not to deny that conservatives are sceptical of egalitarian propositions. But their commitment 
to defending inequality is contingent rather than universal (Freeden, 1996, p. 409).  
In the post-war period, Conservatives often defended certain kinds of inequality and 
criticised the egalitarianism of their Labour opponents. But because their empirical 
observations led them to regard some inequalities as a threat to the harmony of the social order, 
they did endorse some redistributive practices. In 1942, when the Beveridge Report was being 
discussed in parliament, Hogg (1944, p. 57), for instance, declared his sympathy with its 
egalitarian proposals: 
 
The Beveridge scheme is […] a scheme for the abolition of want by the 
instrument of a redistribution wealth. There is no burking that fact. That is what 
it is, and that is what seems to me to constitute its very great value. 
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Hogg buttressed this argument by suggesting that it was necessary for the whole community to 
share the burden of the sacrifices that the nation was enduring. Allowing the poorest members 
of the community to suffer disproportionately would, he argued, do harm to the social ties that 
bound the nation together. Two decades later, Timothy Raison (1964, p. 25) deployed similar 
logic. After drawing attention to the emergence of a ‘technocratic’ class, he warned that if 
status and wealth were disproportionately awarded to those individuals who possessed 
marketable skills, social tensions would become more pronounced. 
It would, of course, be erroneous to suggest that Hogg, Raison and other Middle Way 
Conservatives adhered to a social democratic defence of equality. For most of these figures, 
the rationale for egalitarian practices stemmed from concerns about the social consequences of 
excessive wealth differentials, not a basic commitment to social equality. But their discourses 
do expose their unwillingness to regard inequality as an objective to be obtained.  
 
In a crucial respect, revisionists’ attitudes to equality differed from those of their Conservative 
opponents. While the latter tended to regard certain forms of inequality as immutable features 
of the social order, social democrats were committed to removing disparities of wealth and 
status. But if revisionists were egalitarians, it must also be noted that they were reluctant to 
specify a particular egalitarian arrangement that they believed was desirable. Indeed when we 
attempt to locate a description of the social order that they sought to realise, we are compelled 
to settle for vague formulations. One example is located within Douglas Jay’s Socialism in the 
New Society (Jay, 1962, p. 8). The socialist’s objective, Jay wrote, was to secure the: 
 
minimum of inequality that is workable if human beings are actively to use their 
talents; not equal shares, but fair shares; not equality, but social justice. 
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This formulation was rather imprecise. Not only did it fail to specify what constituted the 
‘workable’ exercise of individual talent, but it also implied that an arrangement that might be 
commensurable with social justice at one moment could be inimical to it at another. To some 
extent, revisionists’ ambiguity regarding their political objectives followed from their 
aforementioned commitment to empirical modes of enquiry. Because no particular 
arrangement could secure the same outcomes indefinitely, it was futile, they argued, to identify 
a distribution of wealth that was desirable (Ayer, 1956; Reisman, 1996, pp. 188). But it is also 
possible to argue that revisionists’ reluctance to specify desired objectives was a consequence 
of their aforementioned concern for social harmony. As Reisman (1997, p. 188) has noted, 
Crosland was sensitive to ‘balance and equilibrium’ when he considered distributive questions. 
Although he advocated a significant redistribution of wealth, he also believed that some 
redistributive measures could provoke the kinds of resentment and envy that social democrats 
were seeking to contain. He was suspicious, for instance, of the notion that income tax could 
be an effective egalitarian instrument. In his view, levying higher taxes upon the wealthier 
members of the community would do little to resolve inequalities of social status (Crosland, 
2006, p. 280).  
 Revisionists were also committed to a democratic conception of equality, whereby the 
distribution of wealth and status was to be determined by criteria that were socially acceptable. 
Hugh Gaitskell’s (1956, p. 3) argument that income differentials should be ‘related to generally 
accepted criteria of merit’, such as the nature of an individual’s work, was characteristic. And 
since these criteria were perceived by revisionists to be underdetermined by empirical 
argument, it followed that the egalitarian should attempt to achieve change within the existing 
climate of opinion (Plant, 1996, pp. 172).  As Reisman (1997, p. 112) has noted in his study of 
Anthony Crosland’s thought, these propositions amounted to a ‘yes-but pragmatism of the 
middle ground’. In their efforts to reconcile efficiency with equality, revisionists gravitated 
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towards a relativist position. No particular arrangement could be regarded as a universal 
panacea to the evils that socialists sought to eradicate or to the problem of securing economic 
growth. It was thus necessary to continually re-evaluate, on the basis of empirical enquiry, 
which arrangements were most conducive to egalitarian change that could be rendered 
compatible with social harmony.  
 
It would be absurd to suggest that Middle Way Conservatives and revisionist social democrats 
were not in disagreement over the question of wealth distribution. While the latter adopted a 
‘strong’ definition of equality that recognised the limitations of equality of opportunity, the 
former were suspicious of any redistributive reforms that could disturb the organic functioning 
of the social order. But it must be established that their disputes about distributive questions 
were contained by their common epistemological assumptions. Neither party believed that a 
particular distribution of wealth was universally desirable, and they were both reluctant to 
engage in distributive reform that would disturb the fragile bonds that were conducive to social 
harmony. Indeed their common enemy – social antagonism – led them to eschew policies that 
would modify the distribution of wealth in a violent manner. So while it is possible to identify 
a significant dispute about the appropriate distribution of wealth, it is necessary to establish 
that this dispute took place within a set of ideational parameters. 
 
Conclusion 
The above survey is incomplete. Indeed further research will need to be conducted to explore 
the full range of the two main parties’ epistemological thought. What it does expose, however, 
is a significant omission in the dispute about the reality or otherwise of Britain’s post-war 
consensus. It has demonstrated that when we explore the epistemologies that informed the main 
parties’ thought and behaviour in the post-war period, it becomes possible to reconcile some 
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of the arguments that have been marshalled to both defend and critique Paul Addison’s thesis.  
As critics of this thesis have demonstrated (Kerr, 2001; Hickson, 2004), the Labour and 
Conservative parties were divided on a series of ideological questions. While the former began 
from the assumption that equality was desirable, the latter were suspicious of egalitarian 
activity. And while Labour’s leaders were more enthusiastic about policies that were designed 
to impair the operation of the market, their opponents often sought to protect it from the 
interference of the state. But because both parties adhered to similar epistemological 
assumptions and, in turn, similar ideas about appropriate political conduct, their disputes were 
contained within a set of ideational parameters. Of these assumptions, perhaps the most 
significant concerned the appropriate function of human reason. Both formations believed that 
this faculty was limited, and they were thus disposed to ‘think about … principles and 
objectives in the light of new facts and greater experience’ (Boyle, 1974, p. 852). Accordingly, 
they shared a common suspicion of the notion that politics could serve fixed ‘ends’,  and they 
both believed that evolutionary change was preferable to radical change. These convergences 
did not eliminate contestation, for both parties began their rational enquiries from different 
starting-points and evaluated their empirical evidence against different criteria. They did, 
however, encourage a constructive approach to political reform that was sensitive to the 
limitations of rational argument to bring about radical change.  
It could be questioned whether this epistemological convergence was a peculiar feature 
of post-war politics. After all, empiricist traditions of political thinking can be traced to much 
earlier moments (Anderson, 1968; Harris, 2000, p. 12). But it must be noted that certain post-
war phenomena encouraged politicians from both sides of the political spectrum to reassess 
their approaches to politics. As Neill (2013, p. 55-56) has stated, the apparent success of the 
welfare state had appeared to render some political controversies redundant. And in the 
conditions of the Cold War, it was often assumed that rationalist assumptions were 
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synonymous with totalitarianism. Both revisionist social democracy and middle way 
Conservatism were formations that responded to these phenomena, and although they 
reproduced many of the beliefs and values of their predecessors, they also departed from some 
of the epistemological ideas that had informed pre-war political thought. While revisionists 
sought to extinguish the traces of utopian Marxism that they detected in the thinking of the 
Labour left, middle way Conservatives, in their efforts to reconcile conservatism with the 
Beveridgean welfare state, embraced some strands of positivist reasoning that were 
incommensurable with some Conservative traditions.  
 Tracing this epistemological convergence is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence 
or otherwise of a post-war political consensus. A full response to that controversy requires an 
investigation into political conduct and policy-making as well as the parties’ thinking. What it 
may suggest, however, is that if such a consensus did exist, we may have been looking for it in 
the wrong places. Rather than being rooted in common ideological beliefs about the desirable 
‘ends’ of political activity, the consensus may have stemmed from epistemological 
assumptions and the political propositions that followed from them. For as the above discussion 
has noted, some political actors were reluctant to specify fixed arrangements that they believed 
were desirable. Instead, they were concerned, above all else, with what Popper termed ‘partial 
ends’, and they devoted just as much attention to the proper conduct of politics as they did to 
the objectives it was designed to serve.  
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Notes 
1 See Kavanagh and Morris (1994, pp. 4-8). 
2 For a summary of this literature, see Fraser (2000).  
3 For an alternative approach to exploring the post-war consensus, see Toye (2012). 
4 In this article, ‘Conservatism’ refers to the ideas and beliefs of the British Conservative party, while 
‘conservatism’ denotes the ideological family with which it is associated.  
5 Macmillan first articulated such a strategy in 1927. See (Boothby et. al., 1927).  
6 Also see Jenkins (1952, p. 72) 
7 For a discussion of conservative epistemology, see O’Hara (2011, p. 23-51), and Dorey (2011, pp. 31-40). 
8 Magee had stood as a parliamentary candidate in the 1959 general election.  
9 It is instructive to compare the epistemology of John Strachey with that of Anthony Crosland. See Strachey 
(1956). 
10 It is notable that revisionists often privileged empirical evidence in their efforts to understand social problems. 
See Anthony Crosland (1958, p. 86-89). 
11 Also see Jenkins (1972, p. 121). 
12 Magee wrote that Popper was the ‘biggest direct influence’ on his thinking. Magee (1962, p. 15). 
13 There was considerable overlap between Popper and Oakeshott’s ideas. See Jacobs and Tregenza (2014).  
14 One such programme can be identified in Hogg’s The Case for Conservatism. In it, Hogg (147, p. 300) 
advocated ‘Social Democracy without socialism’.  
15 Also see Heath (1998, p. 576) and Gilmour (1978, p. 173).  
16 Patten was making reference to a statement by Oakeshott. See Oakeshott (1962, p. 396) 
17 See, for instance, Crosland (2006, pp. 298-299). I owe this point to an anonymous reader.  
18 Elsewhere, Durbin wrote that ‘We do not know ourselves. We are not the simple creatures of rational purpose 
that we think we are’. See Durbin (1940, p. 72).   
19 For Ayer’s views regarding ethical propositions, see A. J. Ayer (1952, pp. 106-110).  
20 Northam, Conservatism, p. 61. Also see Hogg, The Case for Conservatism, p. 12. 
21 Francis Pym articulated this argument in succinct terms. ‘Nothing absolute,’ he wrote, ‘is right for every 
occasion.’  Pym (1984, p. 193).  
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